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Abstract: 10 
This article analyses the impact of a water allocation priority policy for a specific crop 11 
on farmers’ acreage allocation to different crops. To accomplish this, a system of crop 12 
acreage demands conditional on output yields, prices of variable inputs and levels of 13 
quasi-fixed inputs is estimated. The analysis based on a two-year farm household 14 
panel data from an arid region in northwest China. The results show that the water 15 
policy change results in a lower elasticity of land demand not only for Atlantic 16 
potatoes (i.e. the preferential crop), but also for the other crops. Acreage allocation to 17 
grains differs from other crops due to their use within the farm household. Moreover, 18 
the estimated elasticities of quasi-fixed inputs reveal that whereas the area of cash 19 
crops and Atlantic potatoes increases with increased use of own labour before the 20 
policy change, it does so only for cash crops after the policy change. With respect to 21 
own and exchanged labour Atlantic potatoes behave like grains and regular potatoes 22 
after the policy change. 23 
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1. Introduction 27 
Governments interfere quite often in producer’s decision space in agricultural 28 
production systems. In this context the access to irrigation water is contested in many 29 
countries, the more water becomes a scarce input. For this and other reasons, 30 
governments regulate the access to irrigation water. The effects of such interferences, 31 
especially related to water entitlements or water prices, have been frequently analysed 32 
for agricultural systems in North America and Europe (Coyle, 1993; Gorddard, 2009; 33 
Villezca-Becerra and Shumway, 1992; Moore and Negri, 1992; Fezzi and Bateman, 2009). 34 
However, few analyses are known for countries undergoing a process of economic 35 
and institutional transformation where property rights might be less clearly defined. 36 
Furthermore, often implementation and the working of enforcement mechanisms 37 
differ from what is known in North America and Europe.  38 
Agricultural economists often have favoured modelling crop production decisions 39 
in terms of acreage responses rather than output supplies (Coyle, 1993). The key 40 
argument is that acreage planted is essentially independent of many non-behavioural 41 
factors such as seed quality, harvesting intensity and weather conditions, and hence 42 
may provide a closer proxy to planned production than does observed output (Coyle, 43 
1993; Arnade and Kelch, 2007).  44 
Most previous area response studies have estimated response functions separately 45 
for individual crops using a Nerlovian framework of partial adjustment and adaptive 46 
expectations (Nerlove, 1956; Askari and Cummings, 1977). However, problems in 47 
econometric specification and estimation of Nerlove models have been widely 48 
discussed and a number of papers extend the Nerlove model or other acreage response 49 
models to a system of multiple crops. Krakar and Paddock (1985) and Bewley, et al. 50 
(1987) use a multinominal logit approach in studying the allocation of fixed resources 51 
between alternative uses. Coyle (1993) developed an econometric model of crop 52 
acreage demands (for Western Canada) conditional on total crop acreage and related 53 
separability and dynamic specifications to reduce the effects of multicollinearity in 54 
the system. Hussain et al. (1999) estimate changes in crop areas in response to 55 
changes in output prices in Australian broad-acre agriculture, based on a model as a 56 
set of acreage allocation decisions made simultaneously but at a number of 57 
hierarchical stages. More recently, Gorddard (2009) estimates an econometric model 58 
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of Saskatchewan crop land-allocation behaviour and tests for joint production in the 59 
presence of a land constraint. 60 
There are several studies investigating the effects of subsidies and pricing policies 61 
related to agricultural production on crop allocations (Zavaleta, 1987; Rosegrant et al., 62 
1995) or water entitlements on producer behaviour (Moore and Negri, 1992). 63 
Nevertheless, the impact of water policies favouring selected crops and the policy’s 64 
effect on acreage allocation to different crops has rarely been analysed. Land is 65 
always regarded as the most fundamental input in agricultural production. However, 66 
for the production of water-intensive crops in arid regions, land without irrigation 67 
water is almost valueless.  68 
In this paper, we present a model estimating the interaction of the two crucial 69 
inputs in the agricultural production system: land and water. Specifically, we analyse 70 
the impact of a water allocation priority policy for a specific potato variety on 71 
farmers’ decision on acreage allocation among crops. We use the case of an arid 72 
region in northwest China, where agricultural is the biggest consumer of water taking 73 
88.1% of total water resources.1 The policy change regarding water allocation has 74 
been caused by the entry of a potato processor in this region which is partly owned by 75 
the regional government. The potato processing company entered in 2008 and 76 
demands a specific variety of potatoes, called Atlantic potatoes, for processing into 77 
flakes and starch. In order to meet the growing demand for Atlantic potatoes, the local 78 
government assigned water allocation priority for Atlantic potato growing to stimulate 79 
its production in this area. The water allocation priority policy requires that in spite of 80 
the water scarcity in this region, a sufficient amount of irrigation water (i.e. the 81 
amount of water that is physically required for a crop’s production) has to be reserved 82 
for irrigating Atlantic potatoes. The remaining quantity of irrigation water is then 83 
allocated among the other crops. However, the stimulation of producing a crop with 84 
relatively high water demands via institutional instruments conflicts with the 85 
insufficiency of irrigation water in northwest China. Moreover, the sensitivity to pests 86 
and diseases imposes other technical restrictions on potato production (Franke et al., 87 
2011). All these factors raised concerns about the water allocation priority policy. 88 
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This study aims to analyse the effect of the water allocation priority policy on 89 
farmers’ production decisions. We estimate the reaction of farmers to the introduction 90 
of the priority policy in their acreage allocation to various crops. The analysis uses a 91 
unique two-year panel data set of farmers’ acreage decisions. This article contributes 92 
to the literature by analyzing the impact of a priority policy for one agricultural input 93 
used for a specific crop. Compared to standard partial equilibrium analyses, our study 94 
covers the whole cropping part of the farm household and includes indirect effects of 95 
the water priority policy on other crops than Atlantic potatoes.  96 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The following section 97 
establishes, based on a theoretical framework, a set of conditional land demand 98 
functions which will be estimated econometrically. Next, we describe the study area 99 
and the data underlying the econometric analysis. Subsequently, in section 4, we 100 
present and discuss the econometric results. The final section summarizes the main 101 
results of the empirical analysis and provides some policy recommendations. 102 
 103 
2. Conceptual framework 104 
Farmer’s decision of allocating total land to various crops can be modelled 105 
basically in three different ways (Arnberg and Hansen, 2012; Moore et al., 1994). 106 
Programming models, for instance used by Amir and Fisher (2000) to evaluate water 107 
policies in Israel, unfortunately, lack a theory-based behavioural model. Among the 108 
approaches based on neoclassical producer theory, two strands can be distinguished. 109 
Models assuming input jointness assign inputs to all crops. Such an approach does not 110 
allow for a specific analysis of substitution in input use between crops. Alternatively, 111 
Moore et al. (1994) assign all inputs except one quasi-fixed but allocatable input (e.g. 112 
land) to individual crops. That is, variable inputs are used non-joint. The latter 113 
approach has the advantage that interdependences across crops can be accounted for 114 
explicitly in the model. Here we follow the non-jointness approach.  115 
Each farmer is assumed to behave rationally and risk-neutral. Initially each 116 
farmer has a fixed amount of irrigation water which can be allocated to the various 117 
crops. Water trade is permitted since 2002 in this area. However, the vast majority of 118 
farmers do not engage in. Accordingly, each farmer decides how much land to assign 119 
to the different crops based on an optimisation procedure. Here, we assume the farmer 120 
to minimise costs of producing a given level of outputs.   121 
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Assume a farmer operates in a near optimal situation before the introduction of 122 
the water priority policy. After the policy change, the farmer looks for a new optimal 123 
input allocation by minimising costs subject to the previous level of output. Thus, the 124 
intermediate-run decision is the choice of the crops to grow and their acreage. All 125 
crops relevant for our analysis have been assigned to four groups: grain crops, cash 126 
crops, regular potatoes and Atlantic potatoes. Contrary to other studies, e.g. Moore et 127 
al. (1994), the land allocation is variable. The resulting first-order conditions state that 128 
each input’s value of the marginal product in each use should be equal to the 129 
respective input’s price. Introducing a priority policy for one crop, here Atlantic 130 
potatoes, implies an indirect subsidy of the input water for a specific use and an 131 
indirect taxation of this input in alternative uses. To quantify this effect we analyse the 132 
allocation of land to the different outputs. That is, based on the optimisation, the 133 
farmer decides how much land to allocate to output yj. The resulting conditional input 134 
demand function for land xAj is a function of output yields, prices of variable inputs 135 
(w) and levels of quasi-fixed inputs (z): 136 
x
Aj = f(yj, w, z); for j = 1, ..., n 137 
Dividing each equation by total area (xA) returns conditional land demand as a 138 
system of land share equations and normalised exogenous variables: 139 
sj = xAj/xA = f(yj*, w*, z*); for j = 1, ..., n. 140 
Choosing a flexible approximation to a set of possible functional forms, we are 141 
left with the quadratic and translog functional form. Due to zero observations for 142 
outputs and inputs a quadratic functional form seems the best choice. Therefore, the 143 
conditional input demand function derived from a quadratic cost function is: 144 
sj = β0 + Σk βΑk w*k + βAj y*j + Σt βAt z*t; for j = 1, ..., n.. 145 
Together the share functions represent a system of conditional demand functions. 146 
Therefore, the standard theoretical restrictions will apply: The crop specific constants 147 
should add up to unity, the cross-terms should be symmetric and the functions should 148 
be homogeneous of degree zero in prices.  149 
We are especially interested in the effect of the water policy’s change on the 150 
acreage allocation across outputs. It is expected that farmers increase the share of land 151 
allocated to Atlantic potatoes produced for the manufacturer resulting in a lower 152 
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elasticity of land demand. All other crops are expected to show an increasing elasticity 153 
of land demand with respect to the price of water. 154 
 155 
3. Research area and data collection 156 
For this research, we use data that we collected via two surveys held in Minle 157 
County, Zhangye City, Gansu Province. These surveys were carried out in May 2008 158 
and May 2010. The 2008 survey serves as a baseline survey to assess the situation 159 
before the entry of the potato processing company in Minle County and the related 160 
water policy change. The 2010 survey is used to assess the impact of the new water 161 
policy on farmers’ decisions on acreage allocation among crops. 162 
Zhangye City is an oasis located midstream of the Heihe River, an inland river 163 
that flows across Qinghai Province, Gansu Province and Inner Mongolia Autonomous 164 
Region. It originates from the Qilianshan Mountains in Qinghai province and ends in 165 
Juyanhai Lake in Inner Mongolia. In the midstream of the Heihe River watershed, the 166 
land is flat, sunshine is abundant, and annual precipitation is very low while the 167 
evaporation is high. But due to the availability of irrigation water from the Heihe 168 
River, the area has become a major grain and vegetables production base in Gansu 169 
province.  170 
According to the MWR2  (2004), Zhangye City is severely short of water 171 
resources, even though it uses up almost all the water of Heihe River. Only 50% of 172 
farmland is well irrigated, and much arable land has been abandoned due to water 173 
shortage. Agriculture accounts for approximately 95% of all water use and almost all 174 
water in the Heihe River is extracted for irrigation use. As a result, too little water 175 
flows into Juyanhai Lake, which dried out in 1992 and an area of 200 km2 around the 176 
lake became desert (MWR, 2004; Zhang et al., 2009).  177 
To deal with these problems, the Ministry of Water Resources initiated a pilot 178 
project called ‘Building a Water-saving Society in Zhangye City’ in 2002. This project, 179 
which is the first of its type in the country, was designed to save water through 180 
government investments in a water-saving irrigation system and in meters for water 181 
users and through establishing a system of water use rights (WUR) with tradable 182 
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water quotas. The first two measures decreased irrigation water use somewhat, but 183 
trading of WUR did not become popular (Zhang et al., 2009). 184 
Minle County, one of the six counties in Zhangye City, is located between the 185 
foothills of the Qilian Mountains and the lower lying Hexi corridor. Its total cultivated 186 
land area equals 860,000 mu3, with irrigated land constituting 67 %. Major crops in 187 
Minle County include barley, wheat, maize, sesame, rapeseed, garlic and potato. As 188 
rotation, farmers in Minle County regularly change plots devoted to different crops. 189 
Surface water is the major water resource for irrigated agriculture in the area. Due to 190 
the high costs of pumping water from the wells, the use of groundwater is less than 191 
5 % of total water use in irrigated agriculture (Water Bureau of Minle County).  192 
Agricultural land in Minle County is usually divided into three zones with 193 
different planting conditions and water requirements. Zone 1 has an elevation ranging 194 
from 1,600 to 2,000 meters. Precipitation in this zone is relatively scarce. Zone 2 is 195 
located between 2,000 and 2,200 meters, while Zone 3 has an elevation ranging from 196 
2,200 to 2,600 meters. By far the largest zone is the second one, with 500,000 mu of 197 
cultivated land, followed by the first and third zones, with 190,000 and 170,000 mu 198 
respectively. Agricultural production in the first and second zones generally uses 199 
irrigation, while most agricultural production in the third zone is rain fed. 200 
The water used for surface irrigation is stored in seven reservoirs in the 201 
Qilianshan Mountains. Each of these reservoirs serves its own irrigation area within 202 
Minle County. A county-level water management bureau (WMB) is responsible for 203 
the water allocation institutions within the region. Seven lower-level WMBs, one for 204 
each of the seven irrigation areas, arrange the water allocations to WUAs within their 205 
own irrigation area. WUAs are responsible for arranging the water allocation to 206 
households belonging to their own WUA. The households within each WUA are 207 
sub-divided into water user groups (WUGs), consisting of households having plots 208 
along the same channel. Since the plots of different households within a WUG are 209 
irrigated at the same time, households belonging to a WUG need to coordinate their 210 
planting decisions and water demands.  211 
Irrigation is carried out by flooding adjacent farmland at the same time, organized 212 
from lowest to highest altitudes, with villages in the first zone receiving more 213 
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irrigation rounds (generally three) per year than the villages in the other two zones 214 
(generally one or two rounds). Standard water quantities per mu are assigned for each 215 
flooding, but these quantities are only realized in years of abundant rainfall. Water is 216 
allocated according to a quota system based on the size of the so-called WUR land of 217 
the farmers. Not all the irrigated land is classified as WUR land. Its size depends on 218 
the amount of labour provided by a village to the construction of the reservoir and 219 
other factors.  220 
The household survey data used in this study were collected in May 2008 and 221 
May 2010 by staff and students from Gansu Academy of Social Sciences in Lanzhou, 222 
Gansu Agricultural University in Lanzhou, and Nanjing Agricultural University. The 223 
data cover information over the years 2007 and 2009 containing information about 224 
land use, crop production, use as well as prices of water and other inputs, WUA 225 
participation and land tenure. Household interviews were done in the same 21 villages 226 
were a similar household survey was held in May 2008 (see Wachong Castro et al., 227 
2010 for a description of the sampling method). If possible, the same households in 228 
each village that were interviewed in 2008 were also interviewed in May 2010. In 229 
cases were the same household could not be found, it was replaced by another, 230 
randomly selected, household in the same village. This resulted in a panel dataset 231 
containing 265 households. Six households among them rented out their land to other 232 
households and were engaged in off-farm work, thus didn’t grow any crops either in 233 
2007 or in 2009. Additionally, households that had missing data on one or more 234 
variables used in the empirical analysis and the outliers4 were excluded. Finally, the 235 
following empirical analysis uses a two-year panel dataset containing 248 236 
observations (households). 237 
In order to simplify the econometric model, we aggregate crops into four groups: 238 
grains (barley, wheat, sesame and maize), cash crops (rapeseed and garlic), Atlantic 239 
potatoes supplied to the processing company and regular potatoes (various local 240 
varieties). 241 
  242 
4. Data analysis and results 243 
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Total land per household remained almost constant between the two years.5 That 244 
is, the introduction of the water priority policy had no effect on farmers’ decision to 245 
remain in agriculture. However, the policy change in terms of water allocation is 246 
expected to affect the acreage allocation decision. The possibly changing intensity of 247 
other inputs’ use might be affected by the water priority policy. For instance, rational 248 
behaviour suggests a reduced use of inputs when the marginal product decreases 249 
given constant input and output prices. Therefore, in crop-specific production 250 
functions, we apply area shares rather than absolute value of planting areas as the 251 
dependent variable. 252 
Table 1 displays average area shares of the four output categories in 2007 and 253 
2009 (first two columns) and their changes from 2007 to 2009 (last columns).  254 
Table 1 255 
 256 
Because the table presents only changes in the mean and might underrepresent 257 
changes in the tails of the distribution, Graph 1 displays the changes as Kernel 258 
Density estimates. Obviously, the overwhelming majority of farmers kept area shares 259 
rather constant. Cash crops and regular potatoes experienced on average a reduction. 260 
The reduction in area share is particularly remarkable for regular potatoes, highly 261 
probable due to an increase of the share of Atlantic potatoes. 262 
Graph 1 263 
 264 
In the following econometric model the acreage allocation will be explained by 265 
output levels, prices of variable inputs6, levels of quasi-fixed inputs and factors 266 
besides agricultural inputs (e.g. human capital, managerial capabilities, household 267 
characteristics and farm characteristics). All equations include village dummies to 268 
control for regional effects. The definition of all explanatory variables is presented in 269 
Table 2. 270 
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6
 There is little variation of prices of pesticide between the households. Therefore, we do not 
incorporate the pesticide price in the models. 
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Table 2 271 
 272 
The system of land share equations is estimated in two specifications. First, we 273 
estimate two static systems for 2007 and 2009. Second, we estimate the system in first 274 
differences. The first estimates can be interpreted as presenting farmers’ behaviour on 275 
average before and after the water priority policy’s introduction. The second estimates 276 
explore more the change at farm level, by taking out unobserved farm-specific effects 277 
due to first differencing. Of course the second model will miss all time invariant 278 
explanatory variables like farmer’s age as well as slope and fertility of land. 279 
The following Table 3 presents the elasticities derived from the estimated 280 
coefficients.7 The estimated coefficients are presented in the Appendix.  281 
Table 3 282 
 283 
The estimated elasticities indicate that crop-share responses to the changes in 284 
variable input prices vary between different crops. Clearly, acreage allocation to 285 
grains shows the least elastic response variable inputs’ prices and fixed inputs. 286 
Similarly, output changes cause a more elastic change in land demand for grains. This 287 
result holds for the model in levels and for both years. One reason for this behaviour 288 
lies in the essential proportion of grains grown by farmers and the prominent role of 289 
grains in peoples’ diet. Grains are not only planted for selling on markets, but also 290 
used for own food consumption. That is, grains form the most important element in 291 
farmer’s acreage allocation and will be substituted less against other crops. 292 
Generally, elasticities of variable inputs are rather small. One remarkable 293 
exception is the effect of water price changes in 2007 on acreage demand for cash 294 
crops and Atlantic potatoes. Surprisingly, the estimated elasticities are positive, 295 
indicating a larger allocation of land to cash crops and Atlantic potatoes in areas 296 
where water prices are higher. Estimation without village controls yields much higher 297 
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elasticities8. Therefore, regional variation in the water price across WUAs does not 298 
fully explain the higher reagibility of acreage allocation to cash crops and Atlantic 299 
potatoes with respect to water price compared to the other two categories. Area 300 
devoted to regular potatoes is predicted to be smaller in areas with a higher water 301 
price in the 2007 model. After the introduction of the water priority policy, estimated 302 
elasticites with respect to water drop markedly across all crops. Differences across 303 
crops disappear and all elasticities turn out to be positive but very small. Atlantic 304 
potatoes become less attractive; the estimated elasticity drops to 0.021. On the other 305 
hand, for regular potatoes the elasticity increases from -0.038 to 0.030 after the water 306 
policy change.  307 
Regarding the other variable inputs, hired labour stands out for the two types of 308 
potatoes. Similarly, the price of seeds is predicted to cause a stronger reaction of 309 
acreage allocation to cash crops and Atlantic potatoes compared to the two other two 310 
crop categories. Surprisingly, the elasticity for Atlantic potatoes has a positive sign. 311 
Turning to the quasi-fixed inputs reveals an interesting change of Atlantic 312 
potatoes’ position. Whereas the area of cash crops and Atlantic potatoes increases with 313 
increased use of own labour before the policy change, it does so only for cash crops 314 
after the policy change. With respect to own and exchanged labour Atlantic potatoes 315 
behave like grains and regular potatoes after the policy change. With respect to 316 
machinery services there is no change in signs for Atlantic potatoes.   317 
Consistent with theoretical expectations, the output elasticities are all positive. An 318 
increase in crop yields leads to an increase in the area share for each of the four 319 
categories of crops. For instance, in 2007, the area share of Atlantic potatoes is 320 
predicted to increase by 0.006 %, when the yield of Atlantic potatoes goes up by 1 %. 321 
After the introduction of the water priority policy, output elasticity becomes markedly 322 
larger for both types of potatoes.  323 
The results of model 2 show that farmers in areas were water prices increased 324 
reduced their acreage allocation to cash crops, Atlantic potatoes and regular potatoes. 325 
On the contrary, area devoted to grains increased. This is reasonable because grains 326 
receive less amount of water compared to the other three categories of crops. 327 
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Furthermore, increase in wages for hired labour affects cash crops most. The same 328 
holds for the amount of own labour and machinery service.  329 
 330 
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations 331 
This article analyses the impact of a priority policy for one agricultural input used 332 
for a specific crop on farmers’ acreage allocation to different crops. To accomplish 333 
this, we estimate a system of crop acreage demands conditional on output yields, 334 
prices of variable inputs and levels of quasi-fixed inputs. The analysis bases on a 335 
two-year farm household panel data from an arid region in Northwest China. Previous 336 
research on this subject has concentrated on the case studies in North America, where 337 
property rights are relatively well-defined. Our research provides an example for 338 
countries undergoing a process of economic and institutional transformation where 339 
property rights might be less clearly defined.  340 
Our findings indicate that policies related to water allocation regulation have 341 
remarkable effects on farmers’ acreage allocation to various crops. More specifically, 342 
elasticities calculated from the coefficients of the econometric models show that 343 
before the introduction of the priority policy land demand is more elastic with respect 344 
to the price of water, particularly for the preferential crop (i.e. Atlantic potatoes). The 345 
elasticity effects of the prices of other variable inputs are relatively low. After the 346 
priority policy was introduced, the acreage changes become less elastic to the changes 347 
of water price. 348 
The assumption of plots having no quality differences and to be fully divisible 349 
poses a limitation to our conceptual framework. Adding crop rotation requirements is 350 
straightforward and has been demonstrated by Arnberg and Hansen (2012).  351 
An important policy implication that emerges from our results is that priority 352 
policy for an agricultural input clearly affects factor allocation within households, 353 
thus creates imbalances in remuneration of fixed factors. 354 
355 
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Appendix A: 411 
Table A1 412 
 413 
Table A2 414 
 415 
Table A3416 
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Appendix B (for review purposes): 417 
The farmer is assumed to minimise costs as a function of input prices w and 418 
quasi-fixed factors z subject to the produced level of output y before the policy 419 
change by adjusting the variable inputs x. 420 
, for all y.  421 
Solving this optimisation problem yields a short-run cost function. Using a 422 
quadratic functional form, the short-run cost function for a multi-output multi-input 423 
farm is: 424 
 425 
, for all j ≠ k, i ≠ k, t ≠ k. 426 
Applying Shephard’s Lemma yields the conditional input demand function for 427 
land: 428 
. 429 
We divide both sides of the conditional input demand function by total land which 430 
gives the acreage allocation functions for the four crops. Due to missing data on land 431 
prices, the land market is still underdeveloped in China, we have no price of land. 432 
The price elasticity can be derived from the estimated coefficients using the 433 
formula: iii
s
w βε *=
.
 434 
435 
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Tables: 436 
Table 1: Area shares and changes in area shares of crops  437 
Crop Area shares [%] Changes in area shares 2007 – 2009 [percentage points] 
 2007 2009 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Grains 80.6 83.1 2.53 12.3 -37.5 49.2 
Cash crops 10.3 9.8 -0.478 9.62 -50 37.5 
Atlantic potatoes 0.6 1.7 1.07 4.10 -13.6 15.4 
Regular potatoes 8.5 5.4 -3.13 8.59 -43.0 32.3 
 438 
439 
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Table 2: Definitions of explanatory variables 440 
Variable Definition Unit 
Prices of variable inputs 
Hired labour (Pl) Prices of hired labour1 Yuan/minute 
Seeds (Ps) Prices of seeds2 Yuan/gram 
Chemical fertilizer 
(Pf) 
Prices of chemical fertilizer3 Yuan/gram 
Water (Pw) Prices of irrigation water4 Yuan/m3 
Levels of quasi-fixed inputs 
Labour (Lr) Amount of own labour and exchanged labour per mu land Days/mu 
Machinery (M) Amount of money spent on own and hired machinery service 
per mu land 
Yuan/mu 
Output levels 
Grains Yields of grains per mu land Jin9/mu 
Cash crops Yields of cash crops per mu land Jin/mu 
Atlantic potatoes Yields of Atlantic potatoes per mu land Jin/mu 
Regular potatoes Yields of regular potatoes per mu land Jin/mu 
Household characteristics 
Non-working Share of non-working members in the household % 
Gender Ratio of male labourers in the household % 
Age head Age of the head of the household Years 
Education head Years of education of the head of the household Years 
Farm characteristics 
Slope Ratio of land on slope % 
Fertility Average fertility of the land: 3 means bad quality, 1 means good  
Village Dummy variables for different villages  
Notes: 441 
1. Arithmetic average: because for all the households in our sample, they used hired labour for only 442 
one specific crop. 443 
2. Weighted average: for instance for grains, we use the share of cropping shares of wheat, barley, 444 
maize and sesame as the weight to calculate the average prices of seeds of grains. 445 
3. Arithmetic average is applied. 446 
4. Prices of irrigation water are consistent for different crops for a specific household. 447 
448 
                                                        
9
 1 jin=0.5 kg 
19 
 
Table 3: Estimated elasticities  449 
 Grains Cash crops Atlantic 
potatoes 
Regular 
potatoes 
Model 1 - 2007 
Input elasticities 
Price of hired labour 0.005 0.017 -0.063 -0.046 
Price of seeds 0.004 -0.027 0.025 -0.001 
Price of fertilizer -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 0.006 
Price of water -0.018 0.260 0.361 -0.038 
Amount of own labour 
and exchanged labour 
-0.023 0.191 0.262 -0.015 
Expenditures on 
machinery services 
0.008 -0.063 -0.402 0.017 
Output elasticities 
Yields of grains 0.078     
Yields of cash crops  0.013   
Yields of Atlantic potatoes   0.006  
Yields of regular potatoes    0.029 
Model 1 – 2009 
Input elasticities 
Price of hired labour 0.003 -0.023 0.015 -0.018 
Price of seeds 0.003 0.040 -0.056 -0.006 
Price of fertilizer 0.0004 -0.008 -0.012 0.003 
Price of water 0.003 0.004 0.021 0.030 
Amount of own labour 
and exchanged labour 
-0.001 0.027 -0.010 -0.031 
Expenditures on 
machinery services 
0.012 -0.094 -0.064 0.010 
Output elasticities 
Yields of grains 0.020    
Yields of cash crops  0.065   
Yields of Atlantic potatoes   0.386  
Yields of regular potatoes    0.370 
Model 2 (first differences) 
Input elasticities 
Price of hired labour 0.046 0.131 -0.006 0.023 
Price of seeds -0.024 0.019 -0.005 -0.019 
Price of fertilizer -0.0003 -0.001 0.000 -0.0002 
Price of water 0.007 -0.021 -0.005 -0.001 
Amount of own labour 
and exchanged labour 
0.023 0.248 0.008 -0.021 
Expenditures on 
machinery services 
0.011 0.152 -0.051 -0.017 
Output elasticities 
Yields of grains -0.094    
Yields of cash crops  0.249   
Yields of Atlantic potatoes   -0.111  
Yields of regular potatoes    0.019 
 450 
451 
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 452 
Table A1: Results of regression analysis (model 1 - 2007) 453 
 Grains Cash crops Atlantic potatoes Regular potatoes 
Prices of variable inputs 
Price of hired 
labour 
21.0 
(1.03) 
9.83 
(0.63) 
-2.15 
(-0.69) 
-21.6 * 
(-1.70) 
Price of seeds 25.2 ** 
(2.07) 
-21.7 ** 
(-2.36) 
1.19 
(0.63) 
-0.439 
(-0.06) 
Price of fertilizer -30.4 
(-0.32) 
-17.5 
(-0.24) 
-1.49 
(-0.10) 
25.6 
(0.43) 
Price of water -15.8 
(-0.47) 
29.4 
(0.20) 
2.45 
(0.32) 
-3.56 * 
(1.76) 
Levels of quasi-fixed inputs 
Amount of own 
and exchanged 
labour 
-0.185 
(-1.42) 
0.195 ** 
(1.98) 
0.016 
(0.78) 
-0.013 
(-0.16) 
Expenditures on 
machinery service 
0.013 
(0.46) 
-0.013 
(-0.58) 
-0.005 
(-1.06) 
0.003 
(0.14) 
Output levels 
Yields of grains 0.007 * 
(1.65) 
   
Yields of cash 
crops 
 0.004 *** 
(3.70) 
  
Yields of Atlantic 
potatoes 
  0.002 *** 
(16.05) 
 
Yields of regular 
potatoes 
   0.001*** 
(4.59) 
Household characteristics 
Non-working 0.061 
(1.37) 
-0.004 
(-0.13) 
0.012 * 
(1.71) 
-0.036 
(-1.30) 
Gender -0.005 
(-0.10) 
-0.010 
(-0.25) 
-0.004 
(-0.58) 
0.003 
(0.09) 
Age head 0.086 
(1.17) 
-0.082 
(-1.46) 
0.016 
(1.36) 
-0.035 
(-0.76) 
Education head 0.133 
(0.58) 
0.026 
(0.15) 
-0.012 
(-0.33) 
-0.213 
(-1.48) 
Farm characteristics 
Slope -0.039 
(-1.02) 
0.058 ** 
(2.01) 
-0.008 
(-1.30) 
-0.012 
(-0.50) 
Fertility -1.38 
(-0.98) 
-0.208 
(-0.20) 
0.114 
(0.53) 
1.32 
(1.52) 
Village 1 -62.0 *** 
(-12.12) 
64.8 *** 
(16.97) 
0.140 
(0.18) 
-2.10 
(-0.66) 
Village 2 -57.1 *** 
(-13.59) 
56.1 *** 
(17.98) 
0.345 
(0.50) 
-1.94 
(-0.75) 
Village 3 -48.4 *** 
(-11.06) 
47.1 *** 
(13.96) 
0.027 
(0.04) 
0.173 
(0.06) 
Village 4 -30.9 *** 
(-7.64) 
8.41 *** 
(2.71) 
0.296 
(0.47) 
18.8 *** 
(7.35) 
Village 5 -6.16 
(-1.46) 
1.66 
(0.52) 
0.210 
(0.32) 
1.72 
(0.65) 
Village 6 -19.15 *** 
(-4.18) 
1.35 
(0.44) 
-0.001 
(-0.00) 
13.0 *** 
(5.20) 
Village 7 -1.67 
(-0.38) 
-0.269 
(-0.08) 
-0.539 
(-0.80) 
-0.422 
(-0.16) 
Village 8 -3.91 
(-0.99) 
-2.31 
(-0.69) 
0.298 
(0.49) 
-1.13 
(-0.46) 
21 
 
Village 9 -29.7 *** 
(-6.65) 
26.9 *** 
(7.86) 
-0.258 
(-0.37) 
0.317 
(0.11) 
Village 10 -20.5 *** 
(-5.06) 
0.551 
(0.18) 
0.479 
(0.76) 
14.1 *** 
(5.38) 
Village 11 -5.54 
(-1.26) 
0.875 
(0.26) 
0.327 
(0.48) 
0.947 
(0.34) 
Village 12 -11.1 ** 
(-2.30) 
0.644 
(0.18) 
0.265 
(0.36) 
8.05 *** 
(2.68) 
Village 13 -6.02 
(-1.49) 
-0.284 
(-0.09) 
0.363 
(0.58) 
3.01 
(1.17) 
Village 14 -12.5 *** 
(-3.07) 
5.42 * 
(1.76) 
0.133 
(0.21) 
5.73 ** 
(2.25) 
Village 15 0.338 
(0.08) 
-1.06 
(-0.34) 
0.078 
(0.12) 
-0.556 
(-0.22) 
Village 16 -19.5 *** 
(-4.17) 
-0.151 
(-0.04) 
0.295 
(0.42) 
14.5 *** 
(5.01) 
Village 17 -9.09 ** 
(-2.22) 
0.247 
(0.08) 
2.9 *** 
(4.59) 
3.58 
(1.39) 
Village 18 -15.6 *** 
(-2.94) 
0.729 
(0.18) 
0.423 
(0.52) 
11.4 *** 
(3.40) 
Village 19 -7.63 * 
(-1.65) 
-0.453 
(-0.13) 
0.275 
(0.39) 
3.62 
(1.26) 
Village 20 3.60 
(0.83) 
-1.21 
(-0.38) 
0.213 
(0.32) 
-2.84 
(-1.06) 
Intercept  91.4 *** 
(9.44) 
1.72 
(0.26) 
-1.13 
(-0.84) 
-3.44 
(-0.63) 
Number of 
observations 
248 248 248 248 
R2 0.79 0.88 0.67 0.63 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. True 454 
parameters are presented, instead of the estimated coefficients, and t-statistics are in parentheses. 455 
Homogeneity restriction imposed before estimation. 456 
 457 
458 
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Table A2: Results of regression analysis (model 1 - 2009) 459 
 Grains Cash crops Atlantic potatoes Regular potatoes 
Prices of variable inputs 
Price of hired 
labour 
12.9 
(0.75) 
-10.7 
(-0.71) 
1.22 
(0.34) 
-4.72 
(-0.56) 
Price of seeds -32.2 
(-0.53) 
49.4 
(0.94) 
-11.9 
(-0.93) 
-4.10 
(-0.14) 
Price of fertilizer 16.5 
(1.56) 
-39.2 
(-0.22) 
-10.3 
(-0.36) 
7.11 *** 
(-2.53) 
Price of water 2.80 
(0.20) 
0.463 
(0.04) 
0.369 
(0.12) 
1.71 
(0.25) 
Levels of quasi-fixed inputs 
Amount of own 
and exchanged 
labour 
-0.007 
(-0.08) 
0.030 
(0.37) 
-0.002 
(-0.09) 
-0.019 
(-0.42) 
Expenditures on 
machinery service 
0.019 
(0.68) 
-0.017 
(-0.69) 
-0.002 
(-0.43) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
Output levels 
Yields of grains 0.002 
(0.40) 
   
Yields of cash 
crops 
 0.002 ** 
(2.01) 
  
Yields of Atlantic 
potatoes 
  0.001 *** 
(9.58) 
 
Yields of regular 
potatoes 
   0.001 *** 
(4.26) 
Household characteristics 
Non-working 0.027 
(0.55) 
-0.034 
(-0.79) 
0.006 
(0.61) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
Gender -0.018 
(-0.33) 
0.025 
(0.54) 
-0.015 
(-1.34) 
0.015 
(0.59) 
Age head 0.008 
(0.10) 
-0.014 
(-0.21) 
0.027 * 
(1.65) 
-0.029 
(-0.76) 
Education head 0.146 
(0.62) 
-0.038 
(-0.19) 
-0.006 
(-0.12) 
-0.088 
(-0.78) 
Farm characteristics 
Slope 0.093 
(1.46) 
-0.055 
(-1.01) 
-0.036 *** 
(-2.67) 
-0.014 
(-0.45) 
Fertility 0.572 
(0.40) 
0.244 
(0.20) 
-0.223 
(-0.75) 
0.169 
(0.25) 
Village 1 -74.3 *** 
(-12.70) 
78.8 *** 
(16.52) 
-0.053 
(-0.05) 
-2.10 
(-0.80) 
Village 2 -53.6 *** 
(-10.94) 
57.0 *** 
(13.42) 
-0.979 
(-0.95) 
-2.80 
(-1.20) 
Village 3 -46.8 *** 
(-9.80) 
47.1 *** 
(11.34) 
-1.04 
(-1.03) 
1.14 
(0.50) 
Village 4 -10.1 ** 
(-2.25) 
4.50 
(1.13) 
0.277 
(0.29) 
3.50 
(1.63) 
Village 5 -0.065 
(-0.01) 
-0.812 
(-0.20) 
-0.332 
(-0.34) 
-0.912 
(-0.41) 
Village 6 -11.0 *** 
(-2.59) 
0.983 
(0.25) 
-0.908 
(-1.00) 
8.09 *** 
(3.90) 
Village 7 3.43 
(0.73) 
-0.077 
(-0.02) 
-0.720 
(-0.73) 
-1.93 
(-0.87) 
Village 8 0.584 
(0.14) 
-0.466 
(-0.12) 
0.238 
(0.26) 
-2.05 
(-1.00) 
Village 9 -2.06 
(-0.44) 
1.84 
(0.45) 
-0.704 
(-0.71) 
1.54 
(0.69) 
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Village 10 -3.84 
(-0.86) 
-0.401 
(-0.10) 
-0.835 
(-0.87) 
4.63 ** 
(2.12) 
Village 11 -0.685 
(-0.15) 
-0.336 
(-0.08) 
-0.233 
(-0.23) 
-0.077 
(-0.03) 
Village 12 0.124 
(0.02) 
-0.550 
(-0.13) 
-1.01 
(-0.93) 
2.86 
(1.19) 
Village 13 0.772 
(0.17) 
-0.746 
(-0.20) 
-0.674 
(-0.73) 
0.473 
(0.23) 
Village 14 -9.25 ** 
(-2.01) 
6.31 
(1.59) 
1.04 
(1.07) 
1.94 
(0.88) 
Village 15 1.42 
(0.32) 
0.154 
(0.04) 
-0.378 
(-0.41) 
-2.67 
(-1.27) 
Village 16 -17.1 *** 
(-3.39) 
-0.786 
(-0.18) 
-0.042 
(-0.04) 
17.0 *** 
(6.99) 
Village 17 -4.55 
(-1.03) 
0.818 
(0.21) 
5.43 *** 
(5.74) 
-2.11 
(-1.00) 
Village 18 -9.86 * 
(-1.64) 
-0.526 
(-0.10) 
-0.840 
(-0.66) 
9.54 *** 
(3.27) 
Village 19 -4.98 
(-0.92) 
-1.29 
(0.28) 
2.11 * 
(1.90) 
2.92 
(1.16) 
Village 20 1.01 
(0.22) 
0.933 
(-0.23) 
-0.247 
(-0.25) 
-0.548 
(-0.25) 
Intercept  88.8 *** 
(10.74) 
1.09 
(0.18) 
0.802 
(0.54) 
3.42 
(1.03) 
Number of 
observations 
248 248 248 248 
R2 0.79 0.85 0.61 0.53 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. True 460 
parameters are presented, instead of the estimated coefficients, and t-statistics are in parentheses. 461 
Homogeneity restriction imposed before estimation. 462 
463 
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Table A3: Results of regression analysis (model 2) 464 
 Grains Cash crops Atlantic potatoes Regular potatoes 
Prices of variable inputs 
Price of hired 
labour 
38.7 *** 
(2.56) 
-20.9 * 
(-1.80) 
-2.31 
(-0.65) 
-24.1 ** 
(-2.40) 
Price of seeds 12.1 
(0.95) 
1.85 
(0.19) 
1.12 
(0.38) 
-12.0 
(-1.42) 
Price of fertilizer -55.1 
(-0.69) 
16.6 
(0.07) 
2.54 
(-0.95) 
35.7 
(1.05) 
Price of water 4.33 
(0.32) 
2.47 
(0.24) 
-1.35 
(-0.43) 
0.425 
(0.05) 
Levels of quasi-fixed inputs 
Amount of own 
and exchanged 
labour 
-0.041 
(-0.51) 
0.083 
(1.33) 
-0.006 
(-0.30) 
-0.047 
(-0.88) 
Expenditures on 
machinery service 
0.006 
(0.26) 
-0.016 
(-0.94) 
-0.012 ** 
(-2.35) 
0.012 
(0.85) 
Output levels 
Yields of grains 0.004 
(1.08) 
   
Yields of cash 
crops 
 0.002 *** 
(3.11) 
  
Yields of Atlantic 
potatoes 
  0.002 *** 
(15.82) 
 
Yields of regular 
potatoes 
   0.001 *** 
(5.09) 
Household characteristics 
Non-working -0.088 
(-1.60) 
0.087 ** 
(2.08) 
-0.005 
(0.43) 
0.015 
(0.42) 
Gender 0.009 
(0.19) 
0.020 
(0.52) 
0.0002 
(0.02) 
-0.026 
(-0.78) 
Intercept  2.72 *** 
(3.24) 
-0.507 
(-0.81) 
0.365 * 
(1.84) 
-2.83 *** 
(-5.19) 
Number of 
observations 
248 248 248 248 
R2 0.05 0.07 0.53 0.15 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. True 465 
parameters are presented, instead of the estimated coefficients, and t-statistics are in parentheses. 466 
Homogeneity restriction imposed before estimation. 467 
468 
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of changes (between 2007 and 2009) in land 469 
shares  470 
 471 
 472 
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